Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the guest editor and two anonymous referees for their useful comments. We also thank Nicole Adler and Eef Delhaye, as well as seminar participants at EUROCONTROL, OPTION (Amsterdam), ITEA (Oslo), and the USA-Europe ATM conference (Lisbon) for comments on the previous versions
Amihai Glazer and
Economics of Transportation, 2018, vol. 13, issue C, 48-60
This paper studies the behavior of the national air traffic control (ATC) centers in the EU as it relates to bargaining between a union and government. We analyze wage formation, the reactions of ATC's to a price-cap, the slow adoption of new technologies, the reluctance to vertically disintegrate, the slow standardization, and the failures of mergers of neighboring ATC's. The theory is illustrated by using estimated union preference parameters and bargaining power parameters for the government. We find that bargaining power and union preferences vary greatly by country.
Keywords: Air transport control; Political economy; Union bargaining; Governmental subsidy; EU air transport policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L93 R48 J51 L51 L44 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:13:y:2018:i:c:p:48-60
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