The effects of concession revenue sharing contracts in airport competition

Adrián Nerja and M. Sánchez

Economics of Transportation, 2021, vol. 28, issue C

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of concession revenue sharing contracts to analyze how airport–airline vertical structures compete for passengers in the same catchment area. The analysis studies the effects of such contracts depending on airport ownership structure. We show that private airports tend to share less concession revenues than public ones eventually leading to lower welfare levels. These results have relevant policy implications when concession revenue sharing contracts are specified in practice.

Keywords: Revenue sharing contracts; Airport competition; Concession revenues; Airport–airline vertical cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: The effects of concession revenue sharing contracts in airport competition (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:28:y:2021:i:c:s2212012221000381

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100234

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