The effects of concession revenue sharing contracts in airport competition

Adrián Nerja and Mariola Sánchez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of concession revenue sharing contracts to analyze how airport-airline vertical structures compete for passengers in the same catchment area. The analysis studies the effects of such contracts depending on airport ownership structure. We show that private airports tend to share less concession revenues than public ones eventually leading to lower welfare levels. These results have relevant policy implications when concession revenue sharing contracts are specified in practice.

Keywords: Revenue sharing contracts; Airport competition; Concession revenues; Airportairline vertical cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L14 L93 R49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/119160/1/MPRA_paper_119160.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The effects of concession revenue sharing contracts in airport competition (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:119160

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