Airline mergers with low cost carriers

Tomohiko Kawamori and Ming Hsin Lin

Economics of Transportation, 2013, vol. 2, issue 2, 63-71

Abstract: A hub carrier operates one hub linking multiple non-hub cities. It merges with a low cost carrier whose nonstop service competes with its one-stop service. The merged airline's profit is maximized by withdrawing the competing one-stop (nonstop) service when the hub carrier's operating cost and connecting passengers' hub-through additional time costs are large (small). The realized merger is welfare-improving (welfare-decreasing) when these costs are large or small (intermediate). These findings suggest the necessity of merger regulation. In some regions, the necessity of regulation does not monotonically change as network size increases.

Keywords: Airline mergers; Hub-spoke network carriers; Low cost carriers; Antitrust immunity; Schedule competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:2:y:2013:i:2:p:63-71

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2013.04.001

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