Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations

Lata Gangadharan (), Nikos Nikiforakis () and Marie Claire Villeval

European Economic Review, 2017, vol. 100, issue C, 143-156

Abstract: Mechanisms to overcome social dilemmas provide incentives to maximize efficiency. However, often – such as when agents are heterogeneous – there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality – a normative conflict – which is overlooked. Agents’ concerns for equality in such instances can limit the ability of mechanisms to promote efficiency. We provide evidence for this from a public good experiment using a simple mechanism allowing individuals to communicate periodically with other group members and reward them for their actions. We show that, in homogeneous populations – where there is no conflict between efficiency and equality – the mechanism permits groups to obtain maximum efficiency. This is not the case in heterogeneous populations despite the fact that individuals could use rewards to resolve the normative conflict. Although almost all heterogeneous groups agree to follow specific contribution rules with positive contributions, most of them either prioritize equality over efficiency or strike a compromise between the two. These findings suggest normative conflict can be difficult to overcome, imposing limits on the ability of heterogeneous populations to reach efficient outcomes through self-governance.

Keywords: Communication; Rewards; Cooperation; Normative conflict; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D74 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations (2017)
Working Paper: Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations (2017)
Working Paper: Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:143-156

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.07.013

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