Misallocation of talent and human capital: Political economy analysis

Mark Gradstein

European Economic Review, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 148-157

Abstract: Mismatches in the labor market, specifically because of underrepresentation of various population groups, carry significant economic cost. In this paper we argue, using a simple analytical model that an additional cost component is related to the effect of such underrepresentation on incentives to invest in human capital, which results in a mutual feedback relationship between the labor market and the skill acquisition market and may lead to economy's divergence. Further, it is shown that an initially advantaged group may have an incentive to minimize the bias against the disadvantaged group, and that political enfranchisement is the means to achieve a commitment to such a policy.

Keywords: Talent mismatch; Group bias; Human capital; Political enfranchisement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 J71 J78 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:148-157

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.05.010

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