Are patient-regarding preferences stable? Evidence from a laboratory experiment with physicians and medical students from different countries
Tor Iversen (),
Heike Hennig-Schmidt and
Geir Godager ()
European Economic Review, 2020, vol. 125, issue C
We quantify patient-regarding preferences by fitting a bounded rationality model to data from an incentivized laboratory experiment, where Chinese medical doctors, German medical students and Chinese medical students decide under different payment schemes. We find a remarkable stability in patient-regarding preferences when comparing subject pools and we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal patient-regarding preferences in the three groups. The results suggest that a health economic experiment can provide knowledge that reach beyond the student subject pool, and that the preferences of decision-makers in one cultural context can be of relevance in a very different cultural context.
Keywords: Laboratory experiment; Bounded rationality; Payment mechanism; Physician behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D82 H40 I11 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Are patient-regarding preferences stable? Evidence from a laboratory experiment with physicians and medical students from different countries (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:125:y:2020:i:c:s001429212030043x
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