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Non-competing persuaders

Jiemai Wu

European Economic Review, 2020, vol. 127, issue C

Abstract: I study Bayesian persuasion games with multiple persuaders in which the persuaders are non-competing: all persuaders want the decision maker to take the same action, regardless of the state. In the case of a single persuader, it is known from previous research that the persuader-optimal information design leaves the decision maker with no surplus. In this paper, I show that with two or more non-competing persuaders and independent tests, there are always equilibria in which the decision maker receives surplus. If there is exogenous noise then the decision maker receives surplus in every symmetric equilibrium, provided the number of persuaders is sufficiently large; asymptotically, the decision maker learns the true state in every Pareto optimal symmetric equilibrium with infinitely many persuaders. Moreover, with sufficient exogenous noise, having more than one persuader not only improves the welfare of the decision maker but also improves the welfare of the persuaders.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Endogenous information design; Multiple identical persuaders; Imperfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103454

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