On the political economy of industrial, labor and social reforms as complements
Antonio Estache and
European Economic Review, 2021, vol. 137, issue C
This paper shows that ignoring the political relevance of labor and social policies can lead to the failure of an industrial policy designed to modernize an economy. Our analysis is based on a simple model of a two-sector economy (one old and one new) in which policy decisions are adopted under a majority rule. This model suggests that unless, (i) the labor policy ensures that workers have enough bargaining power to give them an incentive to find a job matching their skills in a restructured economy and (ii) the government adopts a social policy compensating the losers of the industrial policy, the new sector is unlikely to develop. Moreover, we find that the credibility of the commitments made drives the effectiveness of the coordination of the three policy elements.
Keywords: Bargaining power; Industrial policy; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D72 J3 L1 L52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: On the Political Economy of Industrial, Labor and Social Reforms as Complements (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:137:y:2021:i:c:s0014292121001392
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