 Preference evolution in different matching marketsJiabin Wu () and Hanzhe Zhang () European Economic Review, 2021, vol. 137, issue C Abstract: We examine preference evolution under different matching market arrangements when preferences are influenced by parental preferences and own choices. Multiple stable equilibria arise under sufficiently random matching, but a unique equilibrium exists under sufficiently assortative matching. Mathematically, the dynamical system exhibits pitchfork bifurcation as the degree of sorting varies. Economically, using market-differential evolutionary trajectories after transitory and permanent shocks, we discuss the model’s implications on (i) the effects of marriage-market structure on female labor force participation such as in the United States and Europe after World Wars, (ii) the persistence of gender norms in developing countries with prevalent arranged marriages such as India, and (iii) the long-run impact of a short-run biased sex ratio on gender norms such as in Australia. Keywords: Preference evolution; Matching market; Pitchfork bifurcation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:137:y:2021:i:c:s0014292121001513 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103804 Access Statistics for this article European Economic Review is currently edited by T.S. Eicher, A. Imrohoroglu, E. Leeper, J. Oechssler and M. Pesendorfer More articles in European Economic Review from Elsevier |
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