Media access, bias and public opinion

Saltuk Ozerturk

European Economic Review, 2022, vol. 147, issue C

Abstract: I develop a model in which an incumbent with reelection concerns seeks to influence public opinion by strategically controlling the media’s access to information. I show that the incumbent’s optimal access strategy balances her demand for positive bias with the public’s demand for credible coverage. The media’s access increases with the competence of politicians over issues under public focus. Controlling media’s access can be instrumental in shaping public opinion, especially in the hands of popular incumbents. Persistence of key election issues, however, decreases the effectiveness of media access control by incumbents.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Access control; Media bias; Key issue; Public opinion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D83 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:147:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122000903

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104161

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