Transmission and use of information in network games

Sergio Currarini, Francesco Feri, Bjoern Hartig and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez ()

European Economic Review, 2023, vol. 155, issue C

Abstract: We design an experiment to study how agents share and make use of information in networks. Agents receive payoff-relevant signals automatically shared with neighbours. We compare the use of information in different network structures, considering games in which strategies are substitute, complement, and orthogonal. To study the incentives to share information across games, we also allow subjects to modify the network before playing the game. We find behavioural deviations from the theoretical prediction in the use of information, which depend on the network structure, the position in the network, and the strategic nature of the game. There is also a bias towards oversharing information, which is related to risk aversion and the position in the network.

Keywords: Networks; Experiment; Information sharing; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; Behavioural biases (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D82 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292123000727
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:155:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123000727

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104443

Access Statistics for this article

European Economic Review is currently edited by T.S. Eicher, A. Imrohoroglu, E. Leeper, J. Oechssler and M. Pesendorfer

More articles in European Economic Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().