Conflict initiation function shapes the evolution of persistent outcomes in group conflict
Ennio Bilancini,
Leonardo Boncinelli and
Pablo Marcos-Prieto
European Economic Review, 2024, vol. 161, issue C
Abstract:
We take an evolutionary perspective to explore the implications of different relationships between power and initiation of conflicts (i.e., conflict initiation function) for the long-run distribution of power between groups. So far, attention has focused on how the role played by the relationship between power and success in conflicts (i.e., conflict success function) affects the long-run distribution of power. We find conditions under which hegemony is a long-run outcome, as well as analogous conditions for balance of power. Specifically, hegemony prevails when conflicts are more likely to be initiated by stronger groups against weaker groups, while balance of power prevails when the opposite holds. Interestingly, the conflict success function plays a minor role in our setting, where victory or defeat are always outcomes that occur with non-negligible probability.
Keywords: Evolution; Balance of power; Hegemony; Group conflict; Error models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:161:y:2024:i:c:s0014292123002763
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104648
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