Pro-sociality of local democratic leaders: The impact and dynamics of being elected

Andreas Landmann and Björn Vollan

European Economic Review, 2024, vol. 164, issue C

Abstract: Democratic regimes need leaders with high intrinsic motivation to serve their constituents. In this paper, we investigate the levels of leaders’ pro-social motivation, how such levels differ from those of villagers, whether they are affected when the leaders are elected, and the persistence over several years. A regression discontinuity design based on close elections combined with a panel of incentivized lab-in-the-field measures of solidarity reveals that being elected and holding office as a local leader results in making more pro-social choices two and six years after the election. An additional experiment measuring normative expectations towards leaders suggests that leaders' higher pro-sociality may come from internalizing these expectations. We also discuss the role of income, collective action and network ties and how the increase in pro-sociality relates to local level corruption.

Keywords: Democratic leadership; Pro-sociality, Political selection; Injunctive norms; Lab-in-the-field; Philippines jel: D72; D90; O12; C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:164:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124000448

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104715

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