The spread of misinformation in networks with individual and social learning

Sebastiano Della Lena

European Economic Review, 2024, vol. 168, issue C

Abstract: The paper studies the spread of misinformation when agents have both individual and social learning. In the presence of sources of misinformation, the most vulnerable and harmful agents are those with poor individual learning and high centrality in the network. However, if opinions are polarized, providing some agents with better private information can backfire on other agents. Moreover, the incentives to spread misinformation have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the spreader’s influence; and, under certain conditions, an unaware spreader can be more harmful than a purposeful one. Overall, this paper warns that any policy that fails to consider both the precision of agents’ private information and the network structure runs the risk of backfiring.

Keywords: Misinformation; Opinion dynamics; Non-Bayesian social learning; Stubborn agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:168:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124001338

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104804

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