Trust dynamics in electoral competition

Nektaria Glynia, Georgios Manalis and Dimitrios Xefteris

European Economic Review, 2025, vol. 179, issue C

Abstract: We study the fragility of trust between voters and politicians, exploring the likelihood of trust recovery following disruptions. We identify a critical trust threshold: above it, the trust dynamics converge to a stable steady state marked by politicians’ moderate deception and voters’ tempered expectations; below it, trust gradually declines, giving way to deepening scepticism. These insights highlight that while stable levels of trust are feasible, they should not be taken for granted, contributing to the discussion on the underpinnings of recent trust crises across European democracies.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Commitment; Trust; Stability; Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:179:y:2025:i:c:s0014292125001758

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105125

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