 Trading institutions in experimental asset markets: Theory and EvidenceBulent Guler, Volodymyr Lugovskyy, Daniela Puzzello and Steven Tucker European Economic Review, 2025, vol. 180, issue C Abstract: We report the results of an experiment that examines the impact of centralized trading institutions on the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. We employ three trading institutions: Call Market, Double Auction, and Tâtonnement. The results show that bubbles are significantly smaller in uniform-price institutions than in Double Auction. We reproduce this and other critical patterns of the data by calibrating a parsimonious model with heterogeneous agents with different levels of sophistication, featuring fundamental and myopic traders. The model matches untargeted data moments and produces larger bubbles under Double Auction, consistent with the experimental data. This is because multiple trades occur within a period under this institution, amplifying the impact of myopic traders with a positive bias on transaction prices. Keywords: Experimental asset markets; Bubbles; Traders’ heterogeneity; Trading institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:180:y:2025:i:c:s0014292125001989 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105148 Access Statistics for this article European Economic Review is currently edited by T.S. Eicher, A. Imrohoroglu, E. Leeper, J. Oechssler and M. Pesendorfer More articles in European Economic Review from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.