Boosting donation and welfare: Augmenting donor-priority rule with information provision
Min Fang,
Mengling Li and
Yohanes E. Riyanto
European Economic Review, 2026, vol. 181, issue C
Abstract:
The global organ shortage poses significant welfare challenges. This study examines policy interventions to incentivize deceased organ donor registration and enhance welfare, focusing on donor-priority incentives and information provision. Our laboratory experiment reveals that granting allocation priority to registered donors boosts donor registration but reduces welfare due to adverse selection. Delaying the timing of donor-priority benefits improves welfare by enhancing donation quality but reduces the registration rate. Augmenting donor-priority rule with information provision proves more effective, simultaneously increasing donor registration and welfare. These findings highlight the potential of combining donor-priority incentives with information provision to alleviate organ shortages while promoting efficiency and social welfare.
Keywords: Market design; Donor registration; Donor priority; Information provision; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D47 D64 D78 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:181:y:2026:i:c:s0014292125002314
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105181
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