Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets

Pierre Chiappori, Ines Macho-Stadler, Patrick Rey and Bernard Salanié

European Economic Review, 1994, vol. 38, issue 8, 1527-1553

Date: 1994
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Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Acces to Credit Markets (1994)
Working Paper: Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets (1989)
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