Wealth constraints, lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation

Joan Esteban () and Debraj Ray

European Economic Review, 2000, vol. 44, issue 4-6, 694-705

Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Wealth Constraints, Lobbying and the Efficiency of Public Allocation (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:4-6:p:694-705

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