Protection for sale or surge protection?
Susumu Imai,
Hajime Katayama and
Kala Krishna ()
European Economic Review, 2009, vol. 53, issue 6, 675-688
Abstract:
This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman "protection for sale" model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occurring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought.
Keywords: Protection; for; sale; Lobbying; Political; economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Protection for Sale or Surge Protection? (2006) 
Working Paper: Protection For Sale Or Surge Protection? (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:6:p:675-688
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