Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council
Axel Dreher (),
Jan-Egbert Sturm () and
James Vreeland ()
European Economic Review, 2009, vol. 53, issue 7, 742-757
We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council.
Keywords: IMF; United; Nations; Security; Council; Voting; Aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:7:p:742-757
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