Media as watchdogs: The role of news media in electoral competition

Jimmy Chan and Wing Suen

European Economic Review, 2009, vol. 53, issue 7, 799-814

Abstract: We develop an equilibrium model to analyze the role of the media in electoral competition. When policy payoffs are state-dependent, party policies do not converge to the median voter's ideal policy if the media report only party policies. News analysis about the state, though possibly biased, can discipline off-equilibrium deviations and make the parties adopt more centrist policies. Since voters are rational, the party favored by the media need not win with a higher probability. Instead, media bias may reduce the effectiveness of electoral competition and lead to more polarized policies.

Keywords: Media; bias; Cheap; talk; Policy; convergence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Working Paper: Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:7:p:799-814

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