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Termination clauses in partnerships

Stefano Comino (), Antonio Nicolo' () and Piero Tedeschi ()

European Economic Review, 2010, vol. 54, issue 5, 718-732

Abstract: We show that when designing a partnership agreement partner firms may prefer not to specify how to allocate the commonly owned assets should there be an early termination of the contract. By not including such a clause, firms induce litigation before a Court with positive probability. Firms create this ex-post inefficiency in order to increase the levels of non-contractible investments, i.e. increase the ex-ante efficiency. The absence of an asset allocation clause works as a "discipline device" that mitigates the hold-up problem within the partnership. In our set-up, no other contract but that without an asset allocation clause can credibly create an ex-post inefficiency.

Keywords: Hold-up; Termination; clauses; Partnerships; Joint; ventures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Termination Clauses in Partnerships (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Termination Clauses in Partnerships (2005) Downloads
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