A controlled field experiment on corruption

Olivier Armantier and Amadou Boly

European Economic Review, 2011, vol. 55, issue 8, 1072-1082

Abstract: This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes, while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous: it lowers the bribe's acceptance, but it fosters reciprocation. Monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but we cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Finally, our results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption including age, ability, religiosity, but not gender.

Keywords: Corruption; Experimental economics; Field experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C93 D73 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (68)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:55:y:2011:i:8:p:1072-1082

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007

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