Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme

Hannes Öhler, Peter Nunnenkamp and Axel Dreher

European Economic Review, 2012, vol. 56, issue 1, 138-153

Abstract: Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appears to have weakened the incentive to fight corruption over time.

Keywords: Foreign aid; Corruption; Millennium Challenge Corporation; MCC effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2011)
Working Paper: Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2010)
Working Paper: Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme (2010)
Working Paper: Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:1:p:138-153

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.05.003

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