The lifeboat problem

Kai Konrad and Dan Kovenock

European Economic Review, 2012, vol. 56, issue 3, 552-559

Abstract: We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (“lifeboat seats”). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (“lifeboats”). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (“a lifeboat”). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (“a seat”). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. The partitioning of prizes can lead to coordination failure when players employ nondegenerate mixed strategies. In these equilibria some rents are sheltered and rent dissipation is reduced.

Keywords: All-pay contest; Multiple prizes; Rent dissipation; Lifeboat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The lifeboat problem (2012)
Working Paper: The Lifeboat Problem (2011)
Working Paper: The Lifeboat Problem (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:3:p:552-559

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.12.004

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