Is polarization bad?
Cecilia Testa
European Economic Review, 2012, vol. 56, issue 6, 1104-1118
Abstract:
The adverse effects of political and social polarization on government policies are empirically well documented, yet some democracies seem to cope well or even benefit from diversity. In this paper we develop a theoretical model to show how elections in polarized societies contribute to improve quality of government. We consider both polarization among citizens and political actors (political polarization), where the second is endogenously determined by parties competing to win the support of the majority of voters. We find that more heterogeneous societies are more likely to be politically polarized, but that the divergence of positions in the political arena helps the electorate control government corruption by raising electoral stakes. Our results, which are consistent with the findings of a substantial empirical literature, suggest that, when funneled into political competition, polarization may help improving quality of government and policies.
Keywords: Diversity; Polarization; Elections; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:6:p:1104-1118
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.04.005
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