On the inefficiency of matching models of unemployment with heterogeneous workers and jobs when firms rank their applicants

Frédéric Gavrel

European Economic Review, 2012, vol. 56, issue 8, 1746-1758

Abstract: In a circular matching model with bargained wages, firms rank their applicants and pick the most suitable one. Job creation appears to lower the average output. As firms do not internalize this effect, there are too many jobs in a laissez-faire equilibrium under the Hosios condition. By contrast, job rejection is efficient for the equilibrium value of market tightness. Consequently, introducing unemployment compensation raises the aggregate income by lowering market tightness. Due to the isomorphism between the two models, these results extend to match-specific productivities. However, competitive search restores market efficiency.

Keywords: Matching; Differentiation of skills; Match-specific productivities; Applicant ranking; Labor market efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:8:p:1746-1758

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.007

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