What is fair? An experimental guide to climate negotiations

Kerri Brick and Martine Visser

European Economic Review, 2015, vol. 74, issue C, 79-95

Abstract: International commitments to reduce emissions must be negotiated between countries in a manner considered to be fair or equitable. While the burden-sharing principles commonly advocated in climate negotiations reflect different views of what constitutes a fair way to distribute the abatement burden, their use can also be strategically motivated to legitimise a specific bargaining position. In this context, using a threshold public good game with a climate change framing, real monetary incentives and drawing on a sample of individuals from the United States, the European Union, China, India and South Africa, this multi-country study examines the degree to which the use of burden-sharing principles reflects material self-interest. In an initial treatment, participants, who represent the country of which they are a national, choose between various burden-sharing principles. In a subsequent treatment, drawing from Rawls׳ veil of ignorance, participants are unaware of which country they represent and are randomly allocated to a country after making their decision. A comparison of participants׳ choices across these two treatments indicates that the use of the historical and future polluter-pays rules by American and Chinese participants is consistent with material self-interest, or, in other words, self-interested use of burden-sharing principles.

Keywords: Public good game; Multi-country study; Multilateral climate negotiations; Fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:74:y:2015:i:c:p:79-95

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.11.010

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