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Reputation for quality and adverse selection

Keiichi Kawai

European Economic Review, 2015, vol. 76, issue C, 47-59

Abstract: We analyze a dynamic market with a seller who can make a one-time investment that affects the returns of tradable assets. The potential buyers of the assets cannot observe the seller׳s investment prior to the trade or verify it in any way after the trade. The market faces two types of inefficiency: the ex-ante inefficiency, i.e., the seller׳s moral hazard problem, and the ex-post inefficiency, i.e., inefficient ex-post allocations due to the adverse selection problem. We analyze how the observability of information by future buyers, through which the seller builds a reputation, affects the two types of inefficiency as well as the interplay between them.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:76:y:2015:i:c:p:47-59

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.02.001

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