Ownership structure, governance, and innovation
Pierluigi Murro () and
European Economic Review, 2015, vol. 80, issue C, 165-193
This paper tests the impact of firms׳ ownership structure on innovation in a context featuring pronounced ownership concentration and conflicts between large and minority shareholders. Using data for 20,000 Italian manufacturers, and accounting for the possible endogeneity of ownership levels, we find that ownership concentration negatively affects innovation, especially by reducing R&D effort. Conflicts between large and minority shareholders appear to be a determinant of this effect. Moreover, risk aversion induced by lack of diversification exacerbates large shareholders׳ reluctance to innovate. Family owners support innovation more than financial institutions, but the benefits of financial institutions increase with their equity stakes.
Keywords: Ownership; Corporate governance; Agency problems; Technological change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Ownership Structure, Governance, and Innovation: Evidence from Italy (2012)
Working Paper: Ownership structure, governance, and innovation: Evidence from Italy (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:80:y:2015:i:c:p:165-193
Access Statistics for this article
European Economic Review is currently edited by T.S. Eicher, A. Imrohoroglu, E. Leeper, J. Oechssler and M. Pesendorfer
More articles in European Economic Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().