Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence
Gilles Grandjean (),
Marco Mantovani (),
Ana Mauleon () and
Vincent Vannetelbosch ()
European Economic Review, 2017, vol. 94, issue C, 90-102
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication—i.e. who is talking with whom—in a coordination game. We run an experiment in a three-player game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of players has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-superior equilibrium. We show that specific communication structures lead to different ‘coalition-proof’ equilibria in this game. Results match the theoretical predictions. Subjects communicate and play the Pareto-superior equilibrium when communication is public. When pairs of players exchange messages privately, subjects play the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. Even in these latter cases, however, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages, despite the fact that these are not credible.
Keywords: Cheap-talk communication; Coordination; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D03 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:94:y:2017:i:c:p:90-102
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