Partnership formation and binomial semivalues

Francesc Carreras, Maria Dolors Llongueras and María Albina Puente

European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, vol. 192, issue 2, 487-499

Abstract: Partnership formation in cooperative games is studied, and binomial semivalues are used to measure the effects of such a type of coalition arising from an agreement between (a group of) players. The joint effect on the set of involved players is also compared with that of the alternative alliance formation. The simple game case is especially considered, and the application to a real life example illustrates the use of coalitional values closely related to the binomial semivalues when dealing with partnership formation and coalitional bargaining simultaneously.

Keywords: Cooperative; game; Coalition; formation; Partnership; Binomial; semivalue (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:192:y:2009:i:2:p:487-499

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