Conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, Claudia Kemfert and Vitaly Kalashnikov

European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, vol. 192, issue 3, 717-729

Abstract: We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent. Next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly. A particular case of a CVE with constant influence (conjecture) coefficients is also examined.

Keywords: Mixed; duopoly; Conjectural; variations; equilibrium; Constant; influence; coefficients (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:192:y:2009:i:3:p:717-729

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