A game theory approach in seller-buyer supply chain
M. Esmaeili,
Mir-Bahador Aryanezhad and
P. Zeephongsekul
European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, vol. 195, issue 2, 442-448
Abstract:
In this paper, several seller-buyer supply chain models are proposed which incorporate both cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between seller and buyer. We assume that unit marketing expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled by non-cooperative and cooperative games, respectively. The non-cooperative game is based on the Stackelberg strategy solution concept, where we consider separately the case when the seller is the leader (Seller-Stackelberg) and also when the buyer is the leader (Buyer-Stackelberg). Pareto efficient solutions will be provided for the cooperative game model. Numerical examples presented in this paper, including sensitivity analysis of some key parameters, will compare the results between different models considered.
Keywords: Cooperative; and; non-cooperative; game; theory; Marketing; Pricing; Seller-buyer; supply; chain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:195:y:2009:i:2:p:442-448
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