Rooted-tree solutions for tree games

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, vol. 203, issue 2, 404-408

Abstract: In this paper, we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by a tree on the set of agents. Agents in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the tree. We introduce natural extensions of the average (rooted)-tree solution (see [Herings, P., van der Laan, G., Talman, D., 2008. The average tree solution for cycle free games. Games and Economic Behavior 62, 77-92]): the marginalist tree solutions and the random tree solutions. We provide an axiomatic characterization of each of these sets of solutions. By the way, we obtain a new characterization of the average tree solution.

Keywords: C71; Average; tree; solution; Communication; structure; Marginal; contributions; Random; (order); values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Working Paper: Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree Games (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:203:y:2010:i:2:p:404-408

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