Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures

Ulrich Faigle (), Michel Grabisch and M. Heyne

European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, vol. 206, issue 1, 104-110

Abstract: Cooperation structures without any a priori assumptions on the combinatorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for marginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic function, which is equivalent to the Lovász extension in the special situation of a classical cooperative game. It is shown that convexity of a cooperation structure is tantamount to the equality of the associated core and Weber set. Extending Myerson's graph model for game theoretic communication, general communication structures are introduced and it is shown that a notion of supermodularity exists for this class that characterizes convexity and properly extends Shapley's convexity model for classical cooperative games.

Keywords: 91A12; 91A40; Communication; structure; Convex; game; Cooperation; structure; Monge; extension; Lovasz; extension; Marginal; value; Ranking; Shapley; value; Supermodularity; Weber; set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377-2217(10)00077-9
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures (2010)
Working Paper: Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:206:y:2010:i:1:p:104-110

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().