Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

Gadi Fibich and Arieh Gavious ()

European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, vol. 206, issue 2, 496-507

Abstract: We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals.

Keywords: Asymmetric; auctions; Interdependent; values; Perturbation; analysis; Revenue; equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:206:y:2010:i:2:p:496-507

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