Economics at your fingertips  

Evolutionary stability of auction and supply chain contracting: An analysis based on disintermediation in the Indian tea supply chains

S. Dutta, S.P. Sarmah and S.K. Goyal
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Saptarshi Dutta () and Shibani Dutta ()

European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, vol. 207, issue 1, 531-538

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show that evolutionary stable market equilibrium is achievable through complete disintermediation of auctioneers if the option of bargaining-based supply chain contracting exists. The paper analyzes the evolutionary dynamics of a market that caters both the scopes of auction-intermediation and supply chain contracting to a set of homogeneous buyers and sellers. The motivation of this work developed from the contradiction between the theoretical framework of Lu and McAfee (1996) that identifies auction to be evolutionary stable over bargaining and the real instance of sustained disintermediation of auctioneers in the world's largest tea industry in India where supply chain contracting is the other option of trading.

Keywords: Auction; Bargaining; Supply; chain; contract; Disintermediation; Indian; tea; industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati

More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().

Page updated 2021-03-05
Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:207:y:2010:i:1:p:531-538