Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups

Arianna Dal Forno and Ugo Merlone

European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, vol. 207, issue 2, 878-885

Abstract: This paper introduces and analyzes a model of supervised work group where subordinates decide how to exert their effort in complementary tasks while the supervisors decide incentives. Incentives may be a combination of individual and group-based ones. The optimality of incentives is analyzed when considering two different cost functions for subordinates. The two cost functions describe different individual motivations; comparing the resulting effort allocations and production optimality, we can relate them to different organizational theories. Our results provide a measure of how motivation among subordinates may affect production and incentives. Furthermore, the optimal incentives schemes are examined in terms of Adams' equity theory.

Keywords: Organization; theory; Production; Organizational; behavior; Incentives; Individual; motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:207:y:2010:i:2:p:878-885

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