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Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core

J. Arin and Vincent Feltkamp

European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, vol. 216, issue 1, 208-213

Abstract: We characterize a monotonic core solution defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core solutions for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the per capita nucleolus is not monotonic.

Keywords: Monotonicity; Core; TU games; Per capita nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.025

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:216:y:2012:i:1:p:208-213