On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices

Josep Freixas, Dorota Marciniak and Montserrat Pons

European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, vol. 216, issue 2, 367-375

Abstract: In this paper, we characterize the games in which Johnston, Shapley–Shubik and Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman indices are ordinally equivalent, meaning that they rank players in the same way. We prove that these three indices are ordinally equivalent in semicomplete simple games, which is a newly defined class that contains complete games and includes most of the real–world examples of binary voting systems. This result constitutes a twofold extension of Diffo Lambo and Moulen’s result (Diffo Lambo and Moulen, 2002) in the sense that ordinal equivalence emerges for three power indices (not just for the Shapley–Shubik and Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman indices), and it holds for a class of games strictly larger than the class of complete games.

Keywords: Game theory; Decision support systems; Simple games; Complete simple games; Power indices; Ordinal equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:216:y:2012:i:2:p:367-375

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.028

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