 Can international environmental cooperation be bought: CommentEuropean Journal of Operational Research, 2012, vol. 216, issue 3, 697-699 Abstract: Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) analytically examine the effects of the countries’ heterogeneity on the international environmental cooperation. They consider two types of countries having different abatement costs in one case and different environmental damages in another case. Furthermore it is analyzed whether a self-financed transfer system can diminish these heterogeneity effects. The paper shows for both scenarios of asymmetry and no transfers that the maximum level of cooperation consists of three countries of the same type. For the case of heterogeneity in environmental damages, Fuentes-Albero and Rubio conclude that an agreement between one type 1 and one type 2 country is also self-enforcing given that the differences in the damages are not very large. In this comment, the derivation of the last mentioned result is shown to be incorrect by proving that this coalition is not self-enforcing. Keywords: Game theory; Self-enforcing international environmental agreements; Environment; Group decision and negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:216:y:2012:i:3:p:697-699 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.08.005 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier |
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