Cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling under general demand settings
Sindhura Balireddi and
Nelson A. Uhan
European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, vol. 217, issue 2, 270-277
Abstract:
We investigate cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling cost-sharing games. We assume that the demand is general—that is, each player can be allocated one of several levels of service. We show how to design mechanisms for these games that are weakly group strategyproof, approximately budget-balanced, and approximately efficient, using approximation algorithms for the underlying scheduling problems. We consider scheduling cost-sharing games in single machine, parallel machine, and concurrent open shop environments.
Keywords: Game theory; Cost sharing; Scheduling; Combinatorial optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221711008587
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:217:y:2012:i:2:p:270-277
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.09.030
Access Statistics for this article
European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati
More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().