 Revisiting a game theoretic framework for the robust railway network design against intentional attacksFederico Perea and Justo Puerto European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, vol. 226, issue 2, 286-292 Abstract: This paper discusses and extends some competitive aspects of the games proposed in an earlier work, where a robust railway network design problem was proposed as a non-cooperative zero-sum game in normal form between a designer/operator and an attacker. Due to the importance of the order of play and the information available to the players at the moment of their decisions, we here extend those previous models by proposing a formulation of this situation as a dynamic game. Besides, we propose a new mathematical programming model that optimizes both the network design and the allocation of security resources over the network. The paper also proposes a model to distribute security resources over an already existing railway network in order to minimize the negative effects of an intentional attack. For the sake of readability, all concepts are introduced with the help of an illustrative example. Keywords: Robust network design; Game theory; Protection resource allocation; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:226:y:2013:i:2:p:286-292 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.11.015 Access Statistics for this article European Journal of Operational Research is currently edited by Roman Slowinski, Jesus Artalejo, Jean-Charles. Billaut, Robert Dyson and Lorenzo Peccati More articles in European Journal of Operational Research from Elsevier |
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