Sharing costs in highways: A game theoretic approach
Jeroen Kuipers,
Manuel A. Mosquera and
José Zarzuelo ()
European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, vol. 228, issue 1, 158-168
Abstract:
This paper introduces a new class of games, highway games, which arise from situations where there is a common resource that agents will jointly use. That resource is an ordered set of several indivisible sections, where each section has an associated fixed cost and each agent requires some consecutive sections. We present an easy formula to calculate the Shapley value, and we present an efficient procedure to calculate the nucleolus for this class of games.
Keywords: Game theory; Highway games; Nucleolus; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:228:y:2013:i:1:p:158-168
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.018
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