Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by Exemption and Exclusion properties

Rene van den Brink (), Yukihiko Funaki () and Gerard van der Laan

European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, vol. 228, issue 2, 413-417

Abstract: The Reverse Talmud rule for bankruptcy problems applies the Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA rule) for ‘large’ amounts of the estate, while it applies the Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL rule) for ‘small’ amounts of the estate. The CEA rule, respectively CEL rule, can be axiomatized using the Exemption and Exclusion properties respectively. There is no rule that satisfies both these two properties. In this paper we axiomatize the Reverse Talmud rule by using compatible weaker versions of the Exemption and Exclusion properties.

Keywords: Economics; Decision support systems; Game theory; Bankruptcy rules; Exemption; Exclusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:228:y:2013:i:2:p:413-417

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.052

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