Cooperation and game-theoretic cost allocation in stochastic inventory models with continuous review

Judith Timmer, Michela Chessa and Richard J. Boucherie

European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, vol. 231, issue 3, 567-576

Abstract: We study cooperation strategies for companies that continuously review their inventories and face Poisson demand. Our main goal is to analyze stable cost allocations of the joint costs. These are such that any group of companies has lower costs than the individual companies. If such allocations exist they provide an incentive for the companies to cooperate.

Keywords: Joint replenishment; Stochastic demand; Cost allocation; Continuous review; Game theory; Inventory model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:231:y:2013:i:3:p:567-576

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.05.051

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