Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in network games with additive preferences

Yann Rébillé and Lionel Richefort

European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, vol. 232, issue 3, 601-606

Abstract: A directed network game of imperfect strategic substitutes with heterogeneous players is analyzed. We consider concave additive separable utility functions that encompass the quasi-linear ones. It is found that pure strategy Nash equilibria verify a non-linear complementarity problem. By requiring appropriate concavity in the utility functions, the existence of an equilibrium point is shown and equilibrium uniqueness is established with a P-matrix. For this reason, it appears that previous findings on network structure and sparsity hold for many more games.

Keywords: Network game; Additive preferences; Complementarity problem; P-matrix (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in network games with additive preferences (2014)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness In Network Games with Additive Preferences (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:232:y:2014:i:3:p:601-606

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.07.014

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